This post is part of Summary Judgment Motions and Evidence.
Had it not been for the subjects the FRB considered, there is no doubt that I would have been promoted to tenure. My motion for partial summary judgment explains:
Both the Subcommittee and Standing Committee confidently concluded that I had more than met HBS’s standards for academic work. (See subcommittee report.) Letters in support of my candidacy were effusive. (SF 89.) Internal letters praised “an amazingly intellectual resource” and “knowledge and brilliance” in “an unusual combination of talents” and an “extraordinary” publication record (letter from F029) with “exceptional impact” including “economic theory at its best” and “risk-taking [in] confronting public issues” (letter from F017).
External letters praised “the careful forensic work that academics are capable of but rarely spend the time to carry out … break[ing] the ivory tower mold” (letter from A001) “as rigorous as … impactful” (A012), a “force of nature [and] amazing role model,” finding “no one like him” in “quality of the top papers, quantity of papers, quantity in top journals, diversity of outlets, influence in the academy and, perhaps most importantly, influence beyond the academy.” (A014) One letter-writer said a recent talk I gave was the “best discussion I’ve ever seen of any paper in any context … everyone in the room learned something … [a perspective] no other economist (or lawyer) could provide.” (A014)
The Subcommittee concluded I was not just “clearly over the bar in terms of [academic research], he is also over the bar on both managerial and educator audiences”—meaning I satisfied all three paths to HBS tenure, an achievement the Subcommittee called “most unusual” because only one is required. (See subcommittee report p.18.) Notes from the 2017 Standing Committee discussion stated “Everyone in attendance believed that [I] passed our standards for scholarship, course development, and teaching.” Healy remembered that my work was “really excellent and more than met our standards for promotion to full professor.” Dean Nohria believed that my scholarly contributions were “well over the bar” of expectations for a tenured professor and that my teaching met HBS’s standards.
There’s considerably more within the exhibits. F018: “economic theory at its best.” “I cannot imagine not promoting him to tenure.” “One can only marvel at his unbounded energy, the depth of his mind, and his creativity in the way that he frames economic problems. These are not the sort of skills one learns in classes or seminars. They are borne of an intense, innate curiosity about every facet of economic activity and a drive to make the world a better place.” F007: “[H]e is a special talent and we need him.” “I can’t imagine that there will be much disputing that Ben meets our standard for outstanding intellectual contribution.” “I support strongly the case for tenure.”
Nohria’s shifting claims
In a final attempt to minimize the FRB’s breaches, Dean Nohria claims he would have withheld support for my candidacy regardless, based on the FRB’s critiques of my lawsuit against American Airlines and my based on the alleged deficiencies in my disclosures. But Nohria’s information was derived entirely from the FRB report—a report tainted at its core by the failings previously detailed. In particular, the FRB’s investigation into these subjects lacked an allegation, expanded impermissibly and at the last minute, and failed to reach the fact-based conclusions required by the P&P. Had the FRB followed the rules, the record before Nohria would have looked totally different. And incidentally Nohria’s deposition indicates that he read the FRB’s report, but nowhere says he even read my reply. (Deposition 82:8: “Did you do anything other than reading the report…? No.”) Reading only the report, and not my reply, Nohria was particularly vulnerable to the FRB’s errors, such as failing even to discuss (not to mention correct) errors I brought to the FRB’s attention.
Furthermore, Nohria admits he found it significant that the Appointments Committee vote was not stronger in favor of my promotion. (SF 81-83.) However, that vote was tainted by the FRB’s distorted presentation of witness testimony. Explaining the rationale for their AC votes, numerous faculty members cited claims from the FRB report—claims I could have rebutted had the FRB shared the evidence and otherwise complied with P&P. The vote was not a correct evaluation of my merits, but a consequence of the FRB’s distortions.
Meanwhile, Nohria’s statement of the reason for his decision has changed over time. In notes for remarks to the Appointments Committee in 2017, he said he was primarily influenced by the vote (“zone of discretion for the Dean”). To me in 2017, he said the main factor was I had “dug [my]self in a hold from 2015 incidents” (he meant 2014). In an email to then-President Faust, he remarked on the lack of a clear recommendation from the AC one way or the other, and identified no other relevant factors on his mind. His affidavit now claims the facts in the FRB’s report were sufficient to support his decision, no matter the flaws in the FRB’s process. I say his affidavit is unpersuasive—looks like a position concocted for litigation, and not his actual reason at the time.
Parting thoughts
I do not claim to be perfect. But I excelled at the things Harvard Business School values: high-impact, practical research and the unique challenge of HBS case-method teaching. There is no other job quite like HBS faculty, and I dedicated myself to it.
The record is clear: My promotion to tenure would have succeeded had the 2017 FRB followed its rules. When HBS bypassed those rules in favor of a predetermined outcome, I was deprived of a career I loved and a promotion I earned. Hence this lawsuit.